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STATE REGULATION AND THE DORMANT 
COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Daniel A. Farber* 
The commerce clause empowers Congress to "regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian Tribes."I Although it speaks only of congressional 
power, the clause has been interpreted to empower the federal 
courts to enjoin state laws that interfere unduly with interstate 
commerce.z 
Since the Marshall Court, the Supreme Court has continually 
modified its definition of the judicial role in overseeing state regula-
tion.3 The Court's current view of the so-called "dormant" com-
merce clause, in a nutshell, is as follows.4 State regulations having a 
discriminatory effect on interstate commerce are subject to stringent 
judicial scrutiny even if the discrimination was inadvertent.S On the 
other hand, regulations that burden interstate commerce without 
discriminating against it are subject to a less rigorous balancing 
test:6 a state law that burdens local and interstate commerce 
equally will be upheld if the law's local benefits outweigh the burden 
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I. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This article will not discuss judicial review in the 
contexts of commerce with foreign nations or Indian tribes. 
2. See G. GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 232 (I Ith ed. 1985); J. NowAK, R. Ro-
TUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 266 (2d ed. 1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 319-21 (1978). 
3. For historical reviews, see NOWAK, ROTUNDA, & YouNG, supra note 2, at 268-74; 
T.R. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 142-79 
(1956); L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 321-26; Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 
VA. L. REV. I, 2-19 (1940). 
4. For more extended discussions of current doctrine, see NowAK, RoTUNDA, & 
YOUNG, supra note 2, at 275-89; L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 326-44. 
5. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT lnv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980). References to 
"direct" versus "indirect" regulation and to "protectionism" are also still to be found in these 
cases. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080 
(1986). 
6. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440-42 (1978). 
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on commerce. 1 
This doctrine is said to serve two purposes: preventing dis-
crimination against outsiders who are not represented in the state's 
political process, and furthering the national interest in free trade 
among the states.s In the last decade, the Court has become in-
creasingly aggressive in its pursuit of these goals.9 
This article will argue for a sharply reduced judicial role in 
reviewing state regulationsio under the dormant commerce clause.11 
The first part will examine some of the flaws in the Court's current 
approach. The second part will then present two proposals for 
redefining the judicial role. One proposal is that courts invalidate 
only laws that intentionally discriminate against interstate com-
merce. The other is that when Congress has given a federal agency 
the power to preempt state legislation, the dormant commerce 
clause should be considered inoperative. These are far from being 
the first scholarly proposals to limit the Court's role in this area,12 
but so far none of the proposals has made headway. The third part 
of the article will consider the reasons why current doctrine has 
been so impervious of change. 
7. Traces of earlier doctrines still appear in the cases from time to time. See NOWAK, 
ROTUNDA, & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 286. 
8. Another rationale sometimes used is that the Court is implementing what it believes 
to be the unexpressed will of Congress. That is, congressional silence is assumed to demon-
strate an intention to place restrictions on the states. See Dowling, supra note 3, at 18-20. 
The obvious flaw in this concept is that congressional silence, in the end, means only that 
Congress has not decided to legislate. Interpreting what Congress means when it has spoken 
is often difficult enough; to determine what Congress means when it has said nothing at all is 
impossible. See generally Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative In-
tent: A Venture into "Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U.L. REv. 737 (1984). 
9. See Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 426, 
437, 474, 482 (1982). 
10. The article will not, however, directly address two related areas: review of state tax 
statutes under the dormant commerce clause, and review of state funding programs and other 
proprietary activities. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 288, 307-95. The 
state taxation cases may be consistent with much of the article's thesis. See Department of 
Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978); Hellerstein, State 
Taxation and the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unified Approach to Constitutional Adjudi-
cation?, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1426 (1977). The proprietary activity cases limit-judicial review 
even more sharply than the proposals made in this article regarding state regulation. 
II. In criticizing the Court's current approach, this Article builds on the work of sev-
eral earlier scholars. See Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism. The Dormant Commerce Clause, 
and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L. REV. 71 (1980); Eule, supra note 9; Kitch, Regula-
tion and the American Common Market, in A. TARLOCK, REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9 (1981); Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too Much-An Exami-
nation of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 47 (1981); Tushnet, Re-
thinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125. On the Court itself, Justice 
Rehnquist has forcefully dissented from several of the Court's decisions. See, e.g., Kassel v. 
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 687 (1981); City of Philadelphia v. New 
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). 
12. See the sources cited in the previous note. 
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THE COURT'S CURRENT APPROACH 
In understanding the Supreme Court's current approach, 13 it is 
useful to distinguish among three types of cases. The first type in-
volves intentional discrimination against interstate commerce.I4 
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey Is illustrates the Court's approach 
to such statutes. New Jersey faced a serious shortage of landfill 
space. To conserve existing space as long as possible, the legislature 
prohibited the importation of waste from other states for disposal in 
New Jersey. The Supreme Court found this legislation unconstitu-
tional on its face. "[W]hatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it 
may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of com-
merce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, 
apart from their origin, to treat them differently."I6 Thus, inten-
tional discrimination against interstate commerce is generally 
prohibited. I? 
Even when discrimination is unintentional, state laws are sub-
ject to substantial scrutiny, as illustrated by Hunt v. Washington 
State Apple Advertising Commission. Is Federal law provided a sys-
tem of grades to be used in labeling apples. North Carolina prohib-
ited the use of any other grades on labels. The suit was brought by 
Washington apple growers, who contended that the Washington 
grading system was superior and that the ban on use of these grades 
impaired the marketability of their apples. The law did not on its 
face discriminate against interstate commerce. The discriminatory 
effect on Washington apples was enough, however, to subject the 
law to heightened scrutiny. Given this discriminatory effect, the 
state had the burden to "justify it both in terms of the local benefits 
flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory 
13. For a review of the recent cases demonstrating what the author calls the Court's 
"strict approach" to state regulation, see Schwartz, Commerce, the States, and the Burger 
Court, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 409, 438 (1979). See also Blumstein, Some Intersections of the 
Negative Commerce Clause and the New Federalism: The Case of Discriminatory State In-
come Tax Treatment of Out-of-State Tax-Exempt Bonds, 31 VAND. L. REV. 473, 484 (1978) 
(referring to the Court's "searching review"; compare with the discussion on pp. 493-95 of 
the Court's "interventionism"). 
14. For a discussion of the discrimination cases, see Blumstein, supra note 13, at 503-
06. 
15. 437 u.s. 617 (1978). 
16. /d. at 626-27. 
17. There is a minor exception for state quarantine laws. See id. at 628-29. Also, the 
Court has not entirely decided whether a facial discrimination is "by itself . . . a fatal de-
fect," or whether it merely "invokes the strictest scrutiny," Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 
322, 337 (1979), but the practical difference seems slight. Maine v. Taylor, 106 S. Ct. 2440 
(1986), upheld a facially discriminatory law after applying strict scrutiny, but might well be 
considered to fit within the "quarantine" exception. 
18. 432 u.s. 333 (1977). 
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alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake."I9 The 
state was unable to carry this burden. 
Even a statute with neither a discriminatory purpose nor a dis-
criminatory effect may be unconstitutional. The leading case on 
commerce clause review of non-discriminatory statutes is Pike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc. 20 Pike involved an Arizona statute governing 
cantaloupe packing. A state official claimed that enforcement of 
this law required that the cantaloupes be packed inside the state, 
which would have required the company to build an expensive new 
packing shed.21 The Court began its constitutional analysis22 with a 
synthesis of the previous case law: 
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affecting inter-
state commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that emerges can be 
phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, 
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive 
in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then 
the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be 
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on 
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. 
Occasionally the Court has candidly undertaken a balancing approach in resolving 
these issues, but more frequently it has spoken in terms of "direct" and "indirect" 
effects and burdens. 23 
The state requirement under consideration in Pike did not survive 
this balancing test. Since Pike, the balancing test has been applied 
to a variety of subjects ranging from state corporation laws to high-
way safety regulations.24 
The Pike test is to some extent rigged against the state. A state 
law may create benefits as well as burdens for outsiders. The bur-
dens are weighed against the state, but any beneficial effect on inter-
state commerce is not weighed.2s Pike, in other words, establishes a 
judicial cost-benefit analysis in which all of the costs of a state law 
are counted, but only some of the benefits. 
The Court's current approach has been subjected to strong 
19. Id. at 353. 
20. 397 u.s. 137 (1970). 
21. Arguably, this requirement should be considered discriminatory, as it distinguishes 
between packing !inns on the basis of their location. 
22. According to the lower court, this administrative order was unauthorized by state 
law. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 62, app. The Supreme Court deemed it unnecessary to defer 
resolution of the constitutional issue while this issue of state law was resolved. See id. at 140. 
23. 397 U.S. at 142 (citations omitted). 
24. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Kassel, 450 U.S. at 662; Allied 
Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); Procter & Gamble Co. v. City 
of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975). 
25. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 644 (state has no legitimate interest in protecting 
nonresidents). 
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scholarly criticism.26 To begin with, results in dormant commerce 
clause cases are notoriously unpredictable.21 This is particularly 
true of the Pike test, which requires an ad hoc balancing based on 
the trial record in each case.2s For example, even after a Wisconsin 
truck regulation was struck down, no one could be sure of the valid-
ity of a similar Iowa regulation until the Court ruled, since the 
records in the two cases differed.29 
The more fundamental flaw in the current approach is that it 
places the Court in the position of evaluating economic policy. 
Under Pike, as Professor Kitch has observed, 
The question, in other words, is not whether the regulation or tax is or is not on 
interstate commerce. The question is whether, all things considered-including the 
national interest-the tax or regulation of commerce, interstate or not, is good or 
bad. This approach, of course, has a close kinship with the now discredited sub-
stantive due process of cases like Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The 
Court abandoned substantive due process in the 1930s, but the method has lived on 
in Commerce Clause matters. . . . 30 
In one recent case, for example, the Court heavily stressed the vir-
tues of the unregulated free market in allocating resources to their 
best use. The Court may be right, but many people share Justice 
Holmes's skepticism about assertions that the Constitution embod-
ies particular economic theories.3t In a decision particularly remi-
niscent of Lochner, the Sixth Circuit concluded that state regulation 
of prices was especially suspect under Pike because it intruded so 
deeply into the free market.32 Thus, in many ways, Pike is a throw-
back to the now discredited era when courts sat as super-legisla-
tures to determine the wisdom of economic regulations.33 Indeed, 
Justices Black and Douglas argued cogently against a predecessor 
of the Pike test on just this ground.34 
26. See Eule, supra note 9; Tushnet, supra note 11. 
27. See Eule, supra note 9, at 479; Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Inter-
vention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 566, 608 (1983); Maltz, supra note 11, at 85-86. For a judicial 
complaint about the doctrinal confusion, see Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. Heintz, 760 
F.2d 1408, 1420, 1421 n.9 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 141 (1986). 
28. See Maltz, supra note 11, at 85-86. 
29. See Kassel, 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Rice, 434 U.S. at 447-48; The Supreme Court: 1980 
Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 91, 93, 100 (1981). 
30. Kitch, supra note 11, at 29-30. 
31. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
32. Rhodes, 679 F.2d at 665 ("state's interest in righting a bargaining imbalance . . . is 
not sufficient under the commerce clause to permit direct interference with pricing where it 
burdens interstate commerce"). 
33. See Tushnet, supra note 11, at 141-42 (Pike balancing indistinguishable from sub-
stantive due process). 
34. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 784, 795 (1945). An even earlier 
opinion, joined by Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas, eloquently explains why this 
form of policymaking should be left to Congress. McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 
u.s. 176, 183-89 (1940). 
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The Court's current willingness3s to strike down state statutes 
under the commerce clause is contrary to other trends over the past 
fifteen years. Even in non-constitutional areas, the Court has at-
tempted to narrow the policymaking role of the federal courts.36 
Moreover, outside of the commerce clause area, the Court has been 
increasingly anxious to prevent the federal judiciary from impairing 
the role of the states in the federal system.37 The Court's willing-
ness to allow vigorous judicial supervision of state regulation in 
commerce clause cases seems inconsistent with its proclaimed at-
tachment to what Justice Black called "Our Federalisrn."3s 
In short, the judicial role under the dormant commerce clause 
seems ripe for reconsideration. 
REFORMULATING THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
It is one thing to show that current law is imperfect, and quite 
another to demonstrate the existence of a superior alternative. Two 
possible reforms will be discussed in this section. One goes to the 
substance of the standard governing state regulation. The other 
would not change the applicable standard, but instead would limit 
the class of cases heard by courts.39 
Adoption of an Intent Standard 
Establishing the proper standard for judicial review under the 
dormant commerce clause requires first that the purposes of judicial 
review be determined. A various times, the Supreme Court has re-
lied on two quite different justifications for judicial review under the 
commerce clause. One justification relates to the political process;40 
the other relates to substantive constitutional values.4' 
The process rationale is based on the lack of representation for 
non-residents in the political process.42 At least since Carolene 
35. For documentation that the Court is increasing its activism under the dormant 
commerce clause, see Eule, supra note 9, at 426, 437, 482. 
36. One noteworthy expression of the Court's philosophy is found in TVA v. Hill, 437 
u.s. 153 (1978). 
37. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1721 (1985); 
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 
72 (1977). 
38. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
39. The two proposals are independent. They have separate justifications, and either 
one could be adopted without the other. 
40. See, e.g., Rice, 434 U.S. at 444 n.18, 447. 
41. See Eule, supra note 9, at 441. 
42. Professor Tribe has highlighted the importance of the process rationale in the dor-
mant commerce clause cases. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 326-27. 
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Products43 it has been a commonplace that judicial review is most 
defensible when it compensates for a defect in the political pro-
cess. 44 The paradigm is judicial protection of minority groups 
under the equal protection clause. Like racial minorities during 
much of our history, out-of-state residents lack political representa-
tion and thus the democratic process may fail fully to safeguard 
their interests.4s 
This process rationale does provide some justification for re-
viewing at least some state legislation.46 In particular, it may justify 
review of state legislation that discriminates against interstate com-
merce. But it falls well short of justifying the extent of judicial re-
view allowed under current doctrine. In particular, lack of political 
representation hardly justifies the Pike test. Under Pike, completely 
non-discriminatory legislation that burdens non-residents is subject 
to judicial review. Since the burden on non-residents is the same as 
that on residents, however, the state's political process seems to of-
fer adequate protection.47 
Therefore, any justification for the Court's current approach 
must rely on substance rather than process. The Court has often 
referred to the important constitutional value of free trade.4s On 
close examination, however, this value does not justify expansive 
judicial review. Admittedly, concern about discriminatory state 
trade barriers was important in motivating the adoption of the Con-
stitution in general and the commerce clause in particular.49 But no 
evidence exists that the clause was intended of its own force to insti-
tute free trade, or that the courts were authorized to supervise state 
legislation.so Indeed, two strong arguments can be made against 
43. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
44. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST ( 1980); Powell, Caro/ene Products Revis· 
ited, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1982); Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protec-
tion Context: Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 GEO. L.J. 89 (1984). 
45. See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 412 (1938); Dowling, supra note 3, at 15. 
46. For a detailed discussion of the process rationale, see Sunstein, Naked Preferences, 
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1705-10 (1984); Tushnet, supra note II, at 130-41. 
47. After all, no one would seriously argue for judicial review of all legislation imposing 
any burden on members of racial minorities, even when that legislation had no disparate 
impact and imposed precisely the same burdens on the majority group. As Dean Ely points 
out, in such cases we rely on "virtual representation" to protect the interests of those lacking 
direct political input. J. ELY, supra note 44, at 82-88. 
48. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350; Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808 
(1976); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-35 (1949). For recent scholarly 
attempts at a substance-based theory of the commerce clause, see Levmore, supra note 27 
(courts should police exploitation of monopoly power by states); Maltz, supra note II, at 64-
65 (courts should uphold "free location" principle). 
49. See Eule, supra note 9, at 430-31. For a review of the historical materials, see Abel, 
The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 
Minn. L. Rev. 432 (1941). 
50. See Anson & Schenkhan, supra note 11, at 78-79; Eule, supra note 9, at 430-31. 
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finding a judicially enforceable value of "free trade" in the clause. 
First, to paraphrase Justice Stevens, "there is only one com-
merce clause."si It is well settled that Congress may not only erect 
trade barriers of its own, but may also freely authorize the states to 
do so.s2 If the clause embodied a constitutional preference for free 
trade, then allowing Congress to use the commerce power to restrict 
trade would be as perverse as using the first amendment as a basis 
for censorship. The breadth of congressional power long recog-
nized by the Court seems to be in tension with the view that the 
clause established free trade as a substantive constitutional goal. 
Second, even finding a free-trade value in the clause would not 
in itself justify a judicial role in enforcing that value. Various por-
tions of article I seem directed at achieving a wide variety of goals, 
from national security to technological progress. Yet no one thinks 
these clauses create any warrant for a judge-made body of law di-
rected at these goals. Thus, justifying current doctrine requires an 
explanation of why a grant of power to Congress has the effect of 
authorizing judicial review of state legislation, when Congress has 
not acted. One traditional justification is that Congress simply can-
not keep up with the myriad of relatively insignificant state barriers 
to free trade.s3 Even if the dubious factual premise of this argument 
is granted,s4 its logic is flawed. The limitations of the other 
branches do not necessarily imply a correlative judicial power to fill 
the need.ss The Constitution places several express limitations on 
forms of state economic regulation that the framers found undesir-
51. Cf Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (S!evens, J., concurring) ("There is 
only one Equal Protection Clause.") The Court has made it clear that there is no two-tiered 
definition of commerce. "Interstate commerce" means the same thing under the dormant 
commerce clause as it does when considering the scope of congressional power. See Hughes 
v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 326 n.2; Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 621-23. 
52. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1982); 
Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648,652-53 
(1981). 
53. See Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the Judici-
ary, 61 YALE L.J. 219, 222 (1957); Dowling, supra note 3, at 24-25. 
54. In reality, the factual premise is probably incorrect. See infra text accompanying 
notes 100 to 104. 
55. For example, experience has shown that it is difficult for Congress to keep up with 
the myriad ways in which individuals seek to avoid the payment of taxes. Yet there is no 
"dormant taxation clause" under which courts create their own rules of tax law. Similarly, 
Congress has done less than a perfect job in executing its enforcement powers under the Civil 
War amendments. By analogy to the dormant commerce clause, the Court could have cre-
ated its own body of civil rights laws governing private individuals, subject to congressional 
override. Yet there is no "dormant civil rights power." Rather than attempting to draw 
authority from these grants of power to Congress, the Court has been content to enforce the 
limitations expressly placed by the Constitution on state action. 
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able. s6 Rather than place such a limitation on state incursions into 
free trade, the framers simply made free trade one of the many as-
pects of "general welfare" entrusted to Congress.s7 
The process approach has recently received strong support 
from the Supreme Court in another federalism-related context. In 
National League of Cities v. Usery,ss the Court had taken upon itself 
the duty of protecting a substantive value (state sovereignty) with-
out any express textual basis. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority,s9 the Court overruled National League of 
Cities. As the Garcia Court explained, judicial intervention is 
proper only when the federal legislative process is inadequate to 
protect the interests of the states. The Court found no such flaw in 
the legislative process behind the extension of the federal minimum 
wage to state employees. 60 If process theory is to determine the 
extent of judicial protection of the states, it seems equally applicable 
when determining judicial limitations on state powers. The teach-
ing of Garcia is that, absent a textual limitation, protection for fed-
eralism-related values is to be found in the political process, with 
judicial intervention only when that process has broken down. By 
the same reasoning, the dormant commerce clause should be lim-
ited to its process rationale.6I 
Under this interpretation, the dormant commerce clause serves 
a function much like that of the equal protection clause. Both pro-
tect politically disenfranchised groups. Yet the scope of protection 
under the two existing doctrines is quite different.62 Under current 
law, interstate businesses receive far more protection from state leg-
islation than do racial minorities. A business can establish a prima 
facie claim under the commerce clause by showing either discrimi-
natory intent, a disparate impact, or a substantial burden. But a 
56. The ban on state tariffs (art. I, § 10, cl. 2) is especially relevant. It would have been 
easy enough to add a ban on state laws burdening commerce. 
57. See Eule, supra note 9, at 434-35. 
58. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). 
59. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). For approving commentary on Garcia, see Field, Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 84 (1985); Frickey, A Further Comment on Stare Decisis and the Overruling of Na-
tional League of Cities, 2 CONST. COMM. 341 (1985). For a sharply critical view of the 
Court's opinion, see Van Alystyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709 
(1985). 
60. The Court's confidence in the responsiveness of Congress to the interests of the 
states has proved correct. Congress promptly amended the statute to ameliorate the impact 
on the states. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat. 
787 (1985). 
61. It is noteworthy that all references to undesirable state legislation prior to the adop-
tion of the Constitution referred to intentional discrimination against nonresidents. See Eule, 
supra note 9, at 430-31. 
62. See Blumstein, supra note 13, at 521-24. 
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law imposing a substantial burden on a racial minority is not con-
sidered suspect; even a disparate impact on the minority is not 
enough. Instead, minority groups must prove discriminatory 
intent.63 
Is this radical difference in doctrine justifiable? Since judicial 
action under the commerce clause is subject to congressional over-
ride, it is less undemocratic than judicial action under the equal 
protection clause. Arguably, therefore, a more freewheeling form of 
review is appropriate under the commerce clause. 
While in isolation this argument may sound strong, powerful 
arguments can be made that review under the commerce clause is 
much less needed than protection of minorities. Typically, govern-
ment actions that burden interstate commerce also adversely affect 
many state residents.64 For example, if outside firms are barred 
from entering a state market, consumers lose the benefit of the com-
petition and pay higher prices. 65 These consumers may not be as 
well organized politically as local business lobbies, 66 but they are 
not completely lacking in political power. Furthermore, multistate 
firms may often be important in a state's domestic economy, giving 
them the opportunity to exert pressure on the government. Finally, 
even if they lack votes, interstate businesses have the other vital in-
gredient of political influence: money. 
Thus, while the harm done to the democratic process by judi-
cial review under the commerce clause is perhaps less, the justifica-
tion for judicial review is also weaker. On balance, it is hard to see 
any justification for providing substantially greater judicial protec-
tion to interstate businesses than to racial minorities. 
Of course, this discussion assumes the correctness of the intent 
standard for equal protection claims, which certainly is open to sub-
stantial dispute.67 But much of the criticism of the intent test in 
equal protection cases is motivated by concerns of little relevance to 
dormant commerce clause cases. Like affirmative action, support 
for the disparate-impact test is usually based on a perception of 
deep-rooted, systematic discrimination. Because of the long history 
of systematic racial and gender discrimination by government, and 
the private prejudices that remain today, government neutrality 
63. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1980); Personnel Adm'r v. Fee-
ney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
64. See Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 11, at 82; Maltz, supra note 11, at 56. 
65. For further discussion of this point, see text accompanying notes 107 to 110, infra. 
66. See Tushnet, supra note 11, at 133, for a discussion of why consumers are arguably 
less likely to organize effectively than businesses. 
67. See Bennett, Reflections on the Role of Motivation Under the Equal Protection 
Clause, 19 Nw. U.L. REV. 1009 (1985), Sherry, supra note 43, at 118-19. 
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may doom some groups to continued inferiority. Therefore, it may 
not be enough to eliminate ill-motivated legislation; instead, per-
haps even heedless government injury to oppressed minorities must 
be eliminated. However valid these arguments may be with respect 
to blacks or women, they are surely misplaced when applied to ma-
jor interstate businesses. A desire to improve the lot of ghetto resi-
dents may lead to a rejection of the intent test in equal protection 
cases, but surely multinational corporations are entitled to no such 
special protection. 
The argument commonly made against an intent standard is 
that adopting this standard would eviscerate the commerce clause. 
Few states, it is said, will be foolish enough to adopt facially dis-
criminatory statutes.6s In reality, however, a surprising number of 
states have adopted such statutes. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, dis-
cussed earlier,69 is only one of the cases of this genre that have 
reached the Supreme Court. 10 Moreover, although problems of 
proof are considerable, they have not proved insurmountable in 
equal protection cases. To be subject to judicial scrutiny, racial dis-
crimination need not be evident on the face of the statute. The 
Court has described the other types of evidence of intent that may 
be adduced in equal protection cases, and the same rules could be 
applied in the commerce clause context.7I 
The contrast between equal protection law and commerce 
clause law is illustrated by two cases. In one, Dean Milk v. City of 
Madison, n Madison passed a law forbidding the sale of milk im-
ported from more than twenty-five miles away, and requiring pas-
teurization plants to be located within five miles of town. 73 
Obviously, the burden fell on Wisconsin farmers outside the 
Madison area as much as on out-of-state farmers. Yet the Court 
struck down the law as facially discriminatory. In contrast, Person-
nel Administrator v. Feeney 74 involved a Massachusetts law giving 
68. Few statutes "artlessly disclose . . . an avowed purpose to discriminate against 
interstate goods," though some do, and dormant commerce clause doctrine would 
have little impact were it confined to a ban on avowedly purposeful discrimination. 
The Court, however, has developed a fairly elaborate structure for analyzing dispa· 
rate effects that might violate the commerce clause. 
Tushnet, supra note I I, at 133. 
69. See supra text accompanying notes I5 to I7. 
70. See, e.g., Northwest Bancorp v. Board of Governors, 105 S. Ct. 2545 (I985); 
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 94I (I982); Lewis, 447 U.S. 27 (I980); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 
44I u.s. 322 (I979). 
71. See Hunter v. Underwood, 105 S. Ct. I9I6 (I985); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 
482 (1977); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977). 
72. 340 u.s. 349 (195I). 
73. !d. at 352. 
74. 442 U.S. 256 (I979). 
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an employment preference to veterans, who were, with few excep-
tions, men. Just as the Wisconsin law excluded many in-state farm-
ers and all out-of-state farmers, the Massachusetts law excluded 
many men and virtually all women. But in Feeney the Court found 
no reason to subject the law to heightened scrutiny as a form of 
gender discrimination. After all, there was no demonstrated intent 
to discriminate against women, and the impact on a large group of 
men provided a political check on the legislature. 
In Dean, the existence of discrimination was considered so seri-
ous as to create almost a per se finding of invalidity, while in Feeney 
there was not even enough discrimination to subject the legislation 
to serious judicial scrutiny. Under the approach suggested in this 
section, Dean would be decided differently. In the absence of a find-
ing of intent to exclude non-residents from the market, the mere 
existence of an exclusionary effect would be irrelevant. 
Another important case that would be decided differently is 
MITE Corp. v. Edgar. 1s MITE involved an Illinois statute directed 
at protecting local shareholders against takeovers. Applying the 
Pike test, the Court struck down the legislation. On the negative 
side, the Court found a substantial barrier to free competition: 
The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to block a nationwide tender 
offer are substantial. Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their 
shares at a premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their highest val-
ued use, a process which can improve efficiency and competition, is hindered. The 
incentive the tender offer mechanism provides incumbent management to perform 
well so that stock prices remain high is reduced.76 
On the benefit side, the Court found that Illinois had "no legitimate 
interest in protecting nonresident shareholders," and in any event 
the Court was "unconvinced that the Illinois Act substantially en-
hances the shareholders' position. "77 In short, the Court thought 
that additional regulation of the tender markets was a bad idea. 
What purported to be enforcement of a federalism concept was in 
reality a policy decision in favor of laissez faire. 
Under the approach proposed in this section, the question of 
how much the securities markets should be regulated would be left 
to Congress and the states. Within the confines of federal statutory 
preemption, the states would be free to make their own policy deci-
sions about securities regulation, so long as they did not intention-
ally discriminate against non-residents. 
75. 457 u.s. 624 (1982). 
76. /d. at 643. 
77. /d. at 644. In particular, the Court believed that the Illinois statute increased the 
risk that tender offers would fail, an outcome that it (but apparently not the Illinois legisla-
ture) viewed as undesirable. /d. at 645. 
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"Preempting" the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Quite apart from the question of what standard should be used 
in judging state laws, is the question of what tribunal should apply 
the standard. In many instances, the federal courts are not the only 
possible national tribunal. Given the breadth of federal regulatory 
power over the national economy, federal administrative agencies 
often have jurisdiction over the industries involved in dormant com-
merce clause cases. They may pass substantive regulations inconsis-
tent with state law, thereby preempting state law. Or, if they 
choose, they may simply adopt regulations stating that state laws 
are preempted. In adopting such regulations, they perform a role 
much like that of courts in dormant commerce clause cases: they 
decide whether a state law unduly infringes on national policies. 
Like the court, the agency speaks for the national interest as against 
parochial local interests. But for several reasons, the agency may be 
a superior decisionmaker. 
The first reason is expertise. 78 A federal judge knows less 
about railroads and interstate trucking than the ICC, less about the 
security industry than the SEC, less about solid waste disposal than 
the EPA. 79 Determining the ultimate economic effects of a law is 
often a delicate undertaking requiring expert knowledge.8o Not 
only are the agency's members more likely to know about an indus-
try than is a judge, but the agency's staff contains a variety of ex-
perts, whose training in fields like economics is likely to be much 
more rigorous than that of the judge's law clerks (typically one or 
two years out of law school). 
The agency also has a superior ability to gather information. 
Unlike the judge, the agency can finance new investigations to in-
crease its data base. Its procedures will also typically require notice 
and comment, allowing all affected factions an opportunity to pres-
ent information. Asking permission to file an amicus brief is hardly 
an equivalent opportunity to be heard. 81 
78. On the complexity of the factual issues courts must decide under the Pike test, see 
Maltz, supra note II, at 85-87. 
79. [T]he balancing inquiry calls for a relatively detailed examination of the partic-
ular industries involved. The Court must understand how cantaloupes, apples, and 
milk are marketed, and it must learn how the regulation in question affects the 
industry. These tasks are far removed from the ordinary business of the Supreme 
Court, and may place burdens on the judicial system that are not worth the benefits. 
Tush net, supra note II, at 156. 
80. See Anson and Schenkhan, supra note II, at 82 ("[o]nly sophisticated economic 
analysis can properly identify the true size and distribution of the burdens and benefits."). 
81. Readers will recognize the foregoing as the classic New Deal justifications for the 
very existence of administrative agencies. While this traditional view has been subject to 
attack, there seems little reason to think that shifting policymaking to courts would be an 
improvement. 
408 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 3:395 
There are more fundamental reasons for preferring an adminis-
trative tribunal. Compared with the federal judiciary, agencies are 
relatively accountable to the political process. Therefore, review of 
state legislation by agencies tends to be more democratic than re-
view by federal courts.82 Moreover, the agency has the advantage 
of an express legislative mandate. After all, it is to the agency, 
rather than to the federal court, that Congress has delegated the 
power to make policy over an industry or business practice. The 
agency, then, has a much better claim than the court to determine 
what is national policy and whether state law conflicts with that 
policy. As the Supreme Court explained in Chevron, U.S.A. v. 
NRDC: 
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the 
Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, 
but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an 
agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within 
the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's 
views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly ac-
countable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this 
political branch of Government to make such policy choices-resolving the compet-
ing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intention-
ally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute 
in light of everyday realities. 83 
Two recent cases strongly support the argument that agencies 
rather than courts should decide when state laws conflict with na-
tional economic policy. The first is City of Milwaukee v. Illinois 
[Milwaukee II]. 84 In Milwaukee L 85 the Court had held that inter-
state water pollution is subject to federal common law. The federal 
courts would determine when one state's pollution unduly affected 
another, just as under Pike they decide when one state's regulations 
unduly affect another's economy. In Milwaukee II, however, the 
Court repudiated any such role for the federal judiciary because in-
tervening legislation had given federal agency jurisdiction over the 
problem. As the Court explained: 
82. Anson and Schenkkan argue that Congress is the most appropriate decisionmaker, 
and that therefore the dormant commerce clause should be wholly abandoned. See Anson & 
Schenkkan, supra note II, at 84. This argument, considered as an original matter, has some 
merit, but it seems too late in the day to argue for complete abandonment of the dormant 
commerce clause. Although the Court has arguably usurped congressional power in this 
area, Congress's long acquiescence must be considered a ratification, at least to the extent of 
authorizing the Court to play some role in supervising state legislation. See generally, United 
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915). Given the Court's many doctrinal changes 
over the years, however, Congress cannot be considered to have ratified any particular judi-
cial approach, such as the Pike test. 
83. Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2793 (1984). 
84. 451 u.s. 304 (1981). 
85. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
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Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not 
possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision. The en-
actment of a federal rule in an area of national concern, and the decision whether to 
displace state law in doing so, is generally made not by the federal judiciary, pur-
posefuliy insulated from democratic pressures, but by the people through their 
elected representatives in Congress. 86 
Precisely the same argument applies when a federal court is asked 
to use the dormant commerce clause to eliminate a state regulation 
in favor of a federal policy of laissez faire. When Congress has cre-
ated an administrative agency with jurisdiction, such judicial 
policymaking becomes superfluous. 
In another recent case, the Court acknowledged that judges 
should be less willing to find that a state law conflicts with national 
policy when a federal agency has jurisdiction over the issue. In 
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. ,87 the 
Court was asked to hold a local regulation of blood banks invalid 
under the supremacy clause. In rejecting this preemption argu-
ment, the Court relied heavily on the FDA's decision not to pre-
empt state law through its regulations: 
Finally, the FDA possesses the authority to promulgate regulations pre-empting 
local legislation that imperils the supply of plasma and can do so with relative ease. 
Moreover, the agency can be expected to monitor, on a continuing basis, the effects 
on the federal program of local requirements. Thus, since the agency has not sug-
gested that the county ordinances interfere with federal goals, we are reluctant in 
the absence of strong evidence to find a threat to the federal goal of ensuring suffi-
cient plasma. 88 
In short, the agency's refusal to preempt created a strong presump-
tion that the ordinance did not conflict with national policy. At 
least an equally strong presumption of consistency with national 
policy should apply when the claim is made under the dormant 
commerce clause. 
Essentially, the argument is quite simple. The Constitution 
gives Congress, not the courts, the role of making policy for the 
interstate economy. When Congress has delegated its policymaking 
role to an administrative agency, that agency should be trusted to 
decide whether a state law is inconsistent with the national interest. 
For a federal court to make that decision is an unnecessary intru-
sion on the policymaking authority of the democratic branches. As 
the Court said in Milwaukee II: 
When Congress has not spoken to a particular issue, however, and when there exists 
a "significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state 
86. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 312-13 (citations omitted). 
87. 105 S. Ct. 2371 (1985). 
88. /d. at 2379 (citations omitted). 
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law," the Court has found it necessary, in a "few and restricted" instances, to de-
velop federal common Jaw. Nothing in this process suggests that courts are better 
suited to develop national policy in areas governed by federal common Jaw than 
they are in other areas, or that the usual and important concerns of an appropriate 
division of functions between the Congress and the federal judiciary are 
inapplicable. We have always recognized that federal common law is "subject to 
the paramount authority of Congress." ... Federal common Jaw is a "necessary 
expedient," and when Congress addresses a question previously governed by a deci-
sion rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise of Jaw-
making by federal courts disappears. 89 
Everything in this passage applied with equal force to the dormant 
commerce clause, regardless of whether one characterizes it as an 
instance of federal common law90 or merely an analogous exercise 
of judicial power. 
Adopting this argument would change the results in some 
cases. For example, in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,9I the Court 
struck down as an undue burden on commerce an Illinois law re-
quiring the use of a certain kind of mudguard on trucks. Under the 
approach suggested in this section, the Illinois statute would be up-
held, since the ICC had expressly decided not to preempt state 
safety standards.92 If indeed the Illinois statute unduly burdened 
commerce, the proper remedy was a petition to the ICC, followed 
by judicial review of the agency's decision. 
Whether allowing Illinois to regulate mudguards was desirable 
or an undue burden on commerce was a question of transportation 
policy no different from countless other policy issues decided by the 
ICC. No reason exists for transferring this particular issue of trans-
portation policy to the federal courts for de novo decision.93 
OVERCOMING DOCTRINAL INERTIA 
To date, scholarly criticisms of dormant commerce clause doc-
trine have been ignored by the Court. Quite apart from the theoret-
89. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 313-14 (footnotes and citations omitted). As Judge Pos-
ner has said, "one might think that once Congress had spoken the 'dormant' commerce 
clause would fall out and the only judicial function would be to enforce the congressional 
enactment." Dynamics Corp. v. crs Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 263 (7th Cir. 1986). 
90. See Levmore, supra note 27, at 569-73; Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Fed-
eral Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 56 (1985); Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common 
Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. I, 14-17 (1974). As Merrill aptly observes, "[s]ince necessity is the 
foundation of preemptive lawmaking, the disappearance of necessity eliminates the founda-
tion for the rule." Merrill, supra, at 58. 
91. 359 u.s. 520 (1959). 
92. See id. at 524 n.S. 
93. Similarly, the state Jaw in Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), would be upheld, 
since the ICC apparently had the power to issue a preemptive regulation. ld. at 764-65. If 
indeed the ICC had jurisdiction, the Court should have left the issue to the Commission. 
Justice Douglas unsuccessfully urged this argument in dissent, id. at 795. 
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ical merits of these criticisms, some important forces work against 
doctrinal change in these areas. It is important to address these 
forces directly. 
The first force working in favor of existing doctrine is stare 
decisis. The Court has, after all, reiterated its current doctrines in a 
number of opinions. That in itself is some reason for retaining the 
doctrines. Yet the argument from precedent is weaker than it may 
appear. Over time, the Court has repeatedly changed its approach 
to the dormant commerce clause, sometimes quite dramatically.94 
There is little reason to treat the most recent formulation as more 
permanent than its predecessors.9s As the Court itself has said, the 
development of commerce clause doctrine has been an "evolution-
ary process," and the Court has felt free to overrule outmoded 
cases. 96 It also should not be forgotten that earlier versions of the 
current test were forcefully opposed by some of the leading Justices 
of recent times, including Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter.97 
Reconsideration is especially appropriate in an area in which 
the Court has always given practical considerations as much weight 
as legal theory.9s Perhaps a correct theoretical analysis is good for 
all time, but practical considerations can be expected to change over 
the years. 
These practical considerations are probably crucial to changing 
the judicial approach to the dormant commerce clause. Even if cur-
rent doctrine is weak as a matter of legal theory, it still might be 
worth retaining if it served an important practical function.99 The 
Court has often proclaimed the importance of the dormant com-
merce clause in maintaining the national economy. If indeed cur-
rent doctrine were important to the health of the economy, 
conceptual purity might have to give way to practical necessity. 
In reality, however, vigorous judicial review is probably not 
needed to keep states from blockading the national economy. Other 
powerful safeguards exist. Historically, state legislation has been 
judicially reviewed under the commerce clause on the basis that 
Congress cannot be expected to trouble itself with minor matters. 
This argument has lost whatever validity it may once have had, as 
Congress has shown itself willing and able to preempt burdensome 
94. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA, & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 268-75. 
95. For a discussion of the relevant factors in reconsidering precedent, see Frickey, 
Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases: Reconsidering National League of Cities, 2 CONST. 
COMM. 123 (1985). 
96. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 326. 
97. See supra note 34. 
98. See Dowling, supra note 3, at 13. 
99. See Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 29, at 101-02. 
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state legislation.1oo 
Although Congress formerly met only for short sessions, and 
therefore may have had time only for the most pressing matters of 
national concern, clearly that is no longer true.101 In particular, 
burdens on commerce that are important enough to justify action 
by the Court are also likely to be important enough to prompt con-
gressional action.102 For instance, after the Court's repeated bouts 
with the issue of truck length on interstate highways, Congress ac-
ted to settle the issue. 1o3 
Since Congress can correct judicial mistakes, what is ultimately 
at stake under the dormant commerce clause is the burden of iner-
tia. Should the states or interstate businesses have the burden of 
getting congressional action? In allocating this burden, it is useful 
to consider which party is more likely to get judicial mistakes cor-
rected. The very reason for giving the power to regulate interstate 
commerce to Congress, rather than to state legislatures, is that Con-
gress is more responsive to the national interest and less responsive 
to parochial interests. If so, those claiming to represent the national 
interest should be better able to secure congressional action than 
their opponents.I04 Hence, the burden of overcoming congressional 
inertia should be on them. 
Two other safeguards against improper state legislation exist. 
First, as we have seen, administrative agencies have the power to 
backstop Congress within the scope of their regulatory authority .ws 
As the Court pointed out in Hillsborough, fewer practical impedi-
ments exist to agency supervision of state legislation than those 
hampering Congress. Agencies have more flexible agendas than 
100. See Eule, supra note 9, at 435-37. 
101. As one author recently observed, "[t]oday Congress interests itself in everything 
from the training of medical technicians and the housing of cats and dogs held for medical 
experiments, to disclosure of consumer credit terms, local Jaw enforcement records, local 
possession of firearms by convicted felons, and health hazards from asbestos insulation in 
public schools." Engdahl, Sense and Nonsense About State Immunity, 2 CONST. COMM. 93, 
108 (1985) (footnote omitted). 
102. See Eule, supra note 9, at 428. 
103. See Kassel, 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Surface Transportation 
Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097 (1982); Department of Transporta-
tion and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-369, 96 Stat. 1965 (1982). 
Professor Gunther queries whether "this evidence of congressional willingness to deal with 
the problem of state burdens on interstate commerce in the highway area indicate that Con-
gress is fully able to protect its own prerogatives and the interests of interstate commerce 
without the active assistance of the courts?" G. GuNTHER, supra note 2, at 245 n.2 (emphasis 
in original). 
104. If interests favoring restraints on free trade had the political clout to get national 
legislation, presumably they would have done so rather than seek duplicative state legislation. 
105. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984); Fidelity Federal Sav. 
& Loan Assn'n v. de 1a Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982). For general discussion, see supra text 
accompanying notes 78 to 93. 
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Congress and are surely able to address even "minor" matters. 106 
More important, agencies, unlike courts, have practical expertise in 
their particular regulatory areas. 
Second, the market exacts its own inexorable penalties for 
needlessly burdensome regulations.107 For example, in Pike, Ari-
zona imposed an apparently senseless and expensive requirement 
that its farmers build packing sheds inside the state. A state that 
makes a practice of doing such things will soon find that multistate 
firms like the plaintiff in Pike 10s are making their investments else-
where. Those farmers remaining in the state will suffer a competi-
tive disadvantage compared with farmers in neighboring states. 
Similarly, laws that protect in-state firms from competition in local 
markets have the effect of raising prices, so the ultimate burden is 
borne by local consumers.I09 These consumers may not be able to 
organize as effectively as business lobbies, but they should not be 
dismissed as a political force. Indeed, Professor Kitch has sug-
gested that these market sanctions are so powerful that state inter-
ference with commerce can only be evanescent.I10 This is perhaps 
an overstatement, but market forces at least offer a strong reinforce-
ment to congressional and administrative oversight of state 
regulations. 
The final factor working against change in the dormant com-
merce clause is that relatively little may seem to be at stake. The 
state laws struck down by the Court typically deal with rather insig-
nificant matters, rather than major issues of public policy. Even if 
the Court has erred, it may seem that there are more important 
battles to be fought. After all, when the Court does go too far in a 
106. Eule, supra note 9, at 435, speaks of the "obvious role" of the administrative agen-
cies in safeguarding the national economy against ill-advised state regulations. 
107. If Arizona burdens its cantaloupe producers with pointless marketing rules, as in 
Pike, Arizona's cantaloupes will become less competitive in the national market. If Illinois 
foolishly legislates to shield inefficient corporate management, as it allegedly did in MITE, its 
economy will suffer as businesses associated with other states gain a competitive edge. See 
Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Dela-
ware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913 (1982). Levmore, supra note 27, at 572-73, 
suggests that state regulation can injure the national economy only when the state has mo-
nopoly power in some market. See also Maloney, McCormick, & Tollison, Economic Regula-
tion, Competitive Governments, and Specialized Resources, 27 J.L. & EcoN. 329 (1984). Such 
cases are likely to be quite rare. 
108. The Bruce Church firm had "for many years been engaged in the business of grow-
ing, harvesting, processing, and packing fruits and vegetables at numerous locations in Ari-
zona and California." The farm involved in the case consisted of 6400 acres, and the 
company had spent more than $3,000,000 developing the land. Pike, 397 U.S. at 139. 
109. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA, & YOUNG, supra note 2, at 281 n.7. 
110. See Kitch, supra note II. Professor Kitch argues, based on a reexamination of the 
historical evidence, that in fact trade barriers were not a major problem prior to the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution. /d. at 11-19. 
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commerce clause case, the states can always ask Congress to over-
rule the decision. 
The practical effects of current doctrine may be more 
profound, however, than individual cases suggest. Because the out-
comes of the cases are so unpredictable, the doctrine may well have 
a chilling effect on legitimate state regulation. The practical signifi-
cance of the dormant commerce clause may be increasing. The 
Court's activity in the area has certainly been increasing. III As the 
national government becomes more tangled in budgetary problems, 
the states may resume more of their historic roles as policymakers 
and laboratories for social experimentation. These efforts may well 
come into question under the dormant commerce clause. Finally, if 
no good purpose is served by current commerce clause doctrine, the 
Court's time is being seriously wasted. 
In summary, the Court's current approach to the dormant 
commerce clause is badly in need of reform. The disparate impact 
and undue burden phases of current doctrine give the federal courts 
an undesirable policymaking role. Under current doctrine, courts 
are asked to decide whether laissez-faire is better national policy 
than state regulation. Such policy determinations are better left 
with more democratic institutions. 
This article suggests two limitations on the judicial role in dor-
mant commerce clause cases. First, the Court should only inter-
vene when an intent to discriminate against interstate commerce 
can be proved. As in equal protection law, disparate impacts or 
undue burdens should not be enough in themselves to trigger judi-
cial review. Second, when administrative agencies have the author-
ity to preempt state rules, federal courts should not become 
involved in determining whether state rules violate national inter-
ests. That determination should be left to the agency or to 
Congress. 
Obviously, the dormant commerce clause does not implicate 
the fundamental social policies involved in abortion or free speech. 
Nevertheless, if the Court's current doctrine is too broad, the error 
is not trivial. Even in relatively unimportant areas, there is some-
thing to be said for allowing the people of a state to determine their 
laws through the democratic process. These values of federalism 
and democratic self-rule are impaired when a federal court imposes 
its own view of desirable social policy on the states. 
Ill. See supra note 35. 
